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Abstract 
Recent econometric evidence has noticeably changed views on the desirability and the 
appropriate design of explicit Deposit Insurance Schemes (DIS). The purpose of this 
paper is to take a second look at the data. After surveying recent empirical work and 
providing a theoretical framework, we argue that existing studies may suffer from a 
selection bias. Building on a new database on explicit deposit insurance compiled by the 
author, we perform a variety of semi-parametric and parametric tests to see whether 
and how explicit deposit insurance (de)stabilizes banking systems. We find that the 
evidence indeed suggests that a selection bias is present. Controlling for this bias leads 
to a reassessment of recent studies. In particular, making deposit insurance explicit has 
a rather moderate and, if any, stabilizing effect on the probability of experiencing a 
systemic crisis. 
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I. Introduction 
During recent debates on the causes of increased financial fragility, the design of 
financial safety nets has been a controversial issue. Viewed from an integrated 
perspective, safety nets comprise a variety of functions, often being accomplished by 
different safety net participants: The “depositor protection function” serves to prevent 
runs, contagious banking problems, and losses to small depositors considered 
intolerable from a socio-economic perspective. Other functions provide support in a 
situation of excess liquidity demand by banks (the “Lender-of-last-Resort function”), 
provide monitoring services for small, uncoordinated and uninformed depositors (“the 
monitoring or supervisory function”) or attenuate the increased risk-taking incentives 
caused by the mere presence of safety nets (the “intervention function”). 
While the deposit insurance function is only one of several elements, it has received a 
disproportionate amount of attention in recent years. In particular, a number of 
empirical studies suggest that explicitly insuring deposits increases the risk of 
experiencing a financial crisis. While it has been always understood that safety nets and 
excessive risk-taking by banks are closely related, the direct empirical link between 
explicit DIS and financial crises has a new quality. In particular, it raises the question 
why formally specifying the rules of the game should be inferior to the implicit 
protection frequently observed in recent episodes of individual and systemic banking 
crises. 
Moreover, recent studies challenged (and changed) existing views on “best practice” in 
deposit insurance design. Table 1 provides a highly stylized overview of some design 
features, spelling out the views on best practice specified in Garcia (1999) and 
according to the views recently expressed (in particular, in the frequently cited 
contribution by Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane, 2002). 
 Garcia Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane 
Desirability 
Only if certain pre-conditions 
prevail. In this case, however, 
explicit DI can significantly 
improve financial system 
performance. 
Only if certain pre-conditions 
prevail. However, DI will increase 
fragility even in proper 
environments. Moreover, very 
few countries fulfill the 
preconditions. 
Membership 
Compulsory, to prevent 
adverse selection and increase 
peer monitoring. 
Compulsory, to prevent adverse 
selection and increase peer 
monitoring. 
Funding Ex ante funding Ex post Funding 
Risk-based 
premiums 
Important Difficult to implement properly 
Government 
Funding 
Emphasize private funding 
but provide credible back-up 
funding in case of insufficient 
funds. 
Emphasize private funding 
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Coverage Limit 
Not too high and not too low 
(1 or 2 times GDP per capita) Low 
General 
eligibility 
Broad Narrow 
Foreign 
Currency 
Deposits 
Depending on country 
circumstances; irrelevant for 
market discipline. 
Exclusion important, to reinforce 
private monitoring 
Inter-bank 
deposits 
Not relevant, when the 
coverage limit is chosen 
sensibly 
Exclusion very relevant, to 
reinforce peer monitoring 
Co-insurance 
Advantages (quick access to 
large depositors funds) and 
disadvantages (lack of 
simplicity and transparency) 
Important to reinforce market 
discipline. 
Administration 
Depending on country 
circumstances; private 
administration raises several 
problems and has to be 
designed carefully. 
Include private sector extensively 
in management and 
administration. 
Table 1: Views on Deposit Insurance 
To conclude, recent years saw a dramatic change of views on the desirability and the 
appropriate design of DIS. They also saw a strong increase in the number of safety nets 
incorporating an explicit scheme, and several important changes in the way existing 
schemes are structured. Since many countries are currently contemplate the 
introduction of a legal framework for depositor compensation, the issue is of prime 
policy relevance. 
The purpose of this paper is to take a second look at theory and evidence to understand 
the effects of making depositor protection explicit. In particular, we argue that existing 
studies fail to take into account the presence of a potential selection bias. After all, the 
decision to introduce a DIS is not a random treatment, but a conscious decision by 
policymakers. Country authorities may “choose to be treated” because of country 
characteristics that are related to financial fragility. Their constituencies might have 
entered a stage in which the financial system is more prone to experiencing a financial 
crisis (or in which the social and economic costs of such an event would be much 
larger). Alternatively, countries that are characterized by particularly generous implicit 
schemes might be more likely to adopt a DIS. 
Indeed, the evidence seems to support the idea that specific country characteristics 
related to financial fragility shape the decision of adopting explicit deposit insurance. 
For example, many recent deposit insurance schemes were introduced after the banking 
sector had experienced major difficulties, either to phase out existent blanket 
guarantees (like in East Asia) or to restore depositor confidence (like in many transition 
economies). Moreover, as will be shown below, several measures of financial fragility 
are strongly correlated with the decision to adopt an explicit scheme. 
Section 2 will survey recent theoretical and empirical work on banking regulation and 
deposit insurance. Since we are not aware of any systematic discussion of the 
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fundamental differences between implicit and explicit depositor protection, we provide 
such an analysis. Section 3 discusses methodological problems of econometric studies 
on the relationship between financial safety net design and systemic crises, emphasizing 
the potential problems caused by not accounting for potential selection biases. It also 
presents the semi-parametric approach used to analyze the issues involved. Data and 
results are presented in section IV, section V concludes. 
II. Un Update of  Theory and Evidence 
1. Theoretical Considerations 
Spurred by the high incidence of banking crises in recent decades, numerous 
researchers have proposed explanations for increased financial fragility. While a 
canonical model of banking crises will probably never emerge, certain features are 
shared by most accounts of the developments. In particular, a large number of 
theoretical and empirical studies emphasize five interrelated aspects: 
 External macroeconomic shocks, for example a deterioration of the terms of trade, 
contagion from other countries or rising interest rates in developed economies. 
 Certain macroeconomic vulnerabilities, for example a high level of external 
indebtedness, high inflation or a significant overvaluation of the real exchange rate. 
 Secular developments in financial markets, in particular domestic and external 
financial liberalization (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999, and Hellmann, Murdock and 
Stiglitz, 2000), and, partly as a consequence, increased competition among financial 
intermediaries (Keeley, 1990 and Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). 
 Lending booms and unsustainable asset price hikes, often associated with increased 
risk taking incentives on the side of bank managers. The latter are often described 
as a result of financial liberalization (Allen and Gale, 2000) or increased competition 
and falling charter values. 
 The existence of (implicit or explicit) safety nets, combined with the inability of 
supervisory and political agents to effectively commit to intervention policies 
counteracting their consequences (Rochet, 2003). 
How does explicit deposit insurance fit into this picture? Obviously, it is an integral part 
of many public safety nets. It therefore has the potential to distort monitoring 
incentives and increase risk taking. However, given the widely recognized importance 
of implicit guarantees and time inconsistent intervention policies, the central question is 
whether and how it matters to explicitly specify the nature of depositor protection. To 
answer this question, the following aspects should be borne in mind:  
 Existing theories dealing with the effects of deposit insurance on the banking 
industry (section 1.1) do not distinguish different degrees of “explicitness”. A 
comparison between explicit and implicit deposit insurance necessitates a clear 
understanding of the nature of banking without a legally specified arrangement 
(section 1.2 below). Why do bank stakeholders (management, depositors and 
shareholders) assign a positive probability to the event of being bailed out, i.e. what 
gives rise to implicit arrangements? What are the characteristics of such a regime? 
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 The way in which explicitness matters will depend on the characteristics of the 
formalized scheme and on certain preconditions (section 1.3). Obviously, different 
contracting environments (the effectiveness of bank supervision, the general quality 
of institutions etc.) will matter. In addition, the literature on banking fragility 
emphasizes the close relation between risk-taking, deposit insurance and charter 
values.1 It is likely that some of the effects discussed in this literature apply to 
implicit and explicit schemes, yet to differing degrees. On the other hand, explicit 
schemes might exhibit characteristics that attenuate or amplify the mechanisms 
relating competition, safety net design, and risk-taking. The effects of a transition 
from implicit to explicit insurance should thus be viewed in the context of the 
market for banking services, with differing degrees of competitiveness and 
concentration. 
 In this respect, the endogeneity of safety net structure has to be taken into account. 
If financial liberalization coupled with decreasing charter values and lower 
concentration is really a major cause of lending booms and financial instability, 
politicians could be tempted to shelter the financial system and small depositors 
from the short-run consequences of these (in the long run) potentially desirable 
policies. In terms of an econometric analysis, it will be necessary to appropriately 
control for the possibility that countries making their financial system vulnerable to 
enhance their long run growth potential have a higher propensity of introducing a 
formal scheme. We will discuss this problem in detail in section III. 
1.1 Deposit Insurance in Economic Theory 
The theoretical literature on deposit insurance has grown considerably in recent 
decades. Without aiming at a complete survey, we review some of the most important 
works to highlight three points:2 First, the few articles on the rationale for deposit 
insurance generally suggest that the existence and design of a scheme are endogenous 
features of financial safety nets - certain industry characteristics imply a specific 
structure. Second, the issue of deposit insurance is closely related to issues of banking 
competition. Third, the existing literature largely neglects differences between explicit 
and implicit schemes. 
Theoretical treatments of depositor protection can be divided into four different 
strands. A first group of articles deals with the economic rationale for deposit 
guarantees. Surprisingly, “few papers address the question of why deposit insurance 
schemes exist.” (Morrison and White, 2004, page 1, italics in the original). Most 
commonly, the existence of deposit insurance is derived from the intrinsic maturity 
mismatch of bank balance sheets and the resulting proneness to self-fulfilling runs 
(Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). The individual fragility of banks is complemented with 
the fact that bank failures may cause large externalities in the form of contagion to 
other banks and a disruption of the payment system. While the literature usually 
confines itself to show that a deposit guarantee will eliminate undesirable equilibria, 
several recent papers emphasize the endogeneity of safety net arrangements. 
Hasanaliyev (2004) as well as Gorton and Huang (2002) show that some form of 
mutual insurance will naturally emerge as a response to costly fragility. Interestingly, 
                                                 
1 Keeley (1990), Matutes and Vives (1996, 2000), Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) as well as Suarez 
(1994) are a few examples of this type of analysis.  
2 See Frolov (2004) for an extensive survey of the literature on deposit insurance.  
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both papers relate the propensity to explicitly safeguard the banking system to the 
degree of fragmentation of the industry. Gorton and Huang (2002) argue that dispersed 
banking systems are characterized by more frequent panics, increasing the likelihood 
that a fundamentally safe bank has to be liquidated. The fear of such a development 
makes sound banks willing to contribute to an insurance scheme. Hasanaliyev (2004) 
argues that industry solutions are difficult to achieve in very competitive environments. 
In this situation, a public involvement becomes more likely. 
Apart from the desire to prevent speculative runs, several recent papers emphasize that 
there may be other reasons to introduce a scheme: First, the desire to increase 
competition in the banking sector could make such a step necessary. As shown in 
Matutes and Vives (1996), systems without any protection might lead to corner 
solutions characterized by complete disintermediation or local monopolies. Second, 
Morrison and White (2004) argue that informational problems lead to a situation where 
banks (which have a superior monitoring technology) receive too few deposits. 
Providing insurance encourages depositing and can thus improve on social welfare. 
Again, characteristics of the baking industry and the propensity to introduce a scheme 
are closely related. The need for extensive insurance is especially strong in weaker 
banking systems (those characterized by higher failure rates): Since the adverse selection 
problem leading to under-depositing is especially severe, optimal policy calls for larger 
deposit insurance subsidies. 
The few papers dealing with the rationale of deposit insurance thus have an interesting 
implication: Specific circumstances may lead to the adoption of an insurance scheme 
with certain design features: The desire to open the market for banking services for new 
entrants, to encourage depositing when confidence in the system is low, or to stabilize 
possibly self-fulfilling expectations might thus endogenously lead to some form of 
protection.  
An insurance scheme, however, could have adverse effects in the sense that it 
discourages monitoring by depositors. The second and by far largest strand of papers 
therefore deals with the pricing of deposit insurance and its effects on risk-taking 
(Merton, 1977). Initially, researchers emphasized the problems of risk-insensitive 
insurance, proposing risk-adjusted premium rates as a solution. Recently, however, 
some authors have advocated the view that the possibility and desirability of fair pricing 
may be limited in the presence of informational asymmetries (Freixas and Rochet, 
1998): First, it may be infeasible to achieve a separating equilibrium in the presence of 
adverse selection. Second, even if such equilibria could be achieved, they would come at 
a cost. In particular, the cross-subsidies necessary to convince weak banks to reveal 
their type will allow overly inefficient banks to remain or enter the market, thus driving 
a wedge between static and dynamic efficiency.  
While recent works raise some skepticism towards risk-related premiums, they do not 
imply that it cannot be a useful tool to limit the risk exposure of banks. In particular, 
insurance pricing may be combined with other regulatory instruments to yield efficient 
solutions.3 Therefore, another approach models deposit insurance pricing together with 
other instruments of banking regulation. Acharya and Dreyfus (1989) jointly derive 
optimal bank closure and risk pricing rules. Sleet and Smith (2000) study the 
                                                 
3 To be sure, the combination of capital adequacy regulation and deposit insurance pricing is not a 
sufficient condition for feasibility, as shown in Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1992). However, it may 
relax some of the constraints emphasized in the literature. 
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relationship between deposit insurance and the Lender-of-Last-Resort. Finally, a large 
literature (surveyed in Santos, 2000) looks at capital regulation and its relation to the 
insurance scheme. A more general message of this literature is that, in the presence of 
informational frictions, it may take several regulatory instruments to achieve an efficient 
solution (Giammarino, Lewis and Sappington, 1993). 
Altogether, the literature on deposit insurance pricing establishes a stable relation 
between excessive risk-taking and the existence of safety nets. However, existing 
research does not imply that explicit deposit insurance is inferior to implicit 
arrangements, since the relevant mechanisms similarly apply to both, at least 
qualitatively. Moreover, many contributions do not model the effects of different 
market structures, an aspect that has received considerable attention in the empirical 
literature (see Carletti and Hartmann, 2002, pp. 25-30). Therefore, starting with Keeley 
(1990), a third group of articles looks at the relationship between deposit insurance, 
competition and stability. The great majority of studies suggest that more competition 
leads to an increase fragility (see, for example, Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz, 2000, 
and Cordella and Yeyati, 2002). While competition is not always a necessary condition 
for excessive fragility, its effects are present with and without deposit insurance. Most 
contributions simply compare the effects of DI in different market settings (or, 
alternatively, the effects of competition in different DI schemes), without endogenising 
market interaction. An exception is the work by Matutes and Vives (1996, 2000), who 
built a model of competition in an environment with fragile individual institutions. 
Their findings imply that the introduction of deposit insurance may entail complicated 
welfare trade-offs, whose exact nature will depend on market structure. On the positive 
side, an insurance scheme will eliminate undesirable equilibria (complete 
disintermediation due to coordination failures or local monopolies) and extend the 
market. However, deposit insurance may also intensify competition or lower 
diversification within a single bank. Since increased competition/decreased 
diversification may intensify risk-taking, the desirability of a scheme will depend on the 
prevailing market structure. Note, however, that the latter itself will be changed after 
the scheme has been launched.4  
Finally, a fourth group of papers looks at the role of the Deposit Insurance Agency 
(DIA) within the general institutional structure of banking supervision. While the role 
of the central bank and the question of integrated supervision receive much more 
attention in the debate on bank regulatory structure, some recent theoretical studies 
convincingly argue that the question might be more relevant than often suggested (see, 
for instance, Repullo, 2000, Kahn and Santos, 2001, and Pages and Santos, 2003). In 
particular, since the objective function of the DIA will be different form the ones of 
other safety net players, it is reasonable to expect a different approach to supervision 
and intervention, depending on the allocation of control rights.  
Surprisingly, the literature almost exclusively does not distinguish between explicit and 
implicit arrangements. In a survey paper, Frolov (2004, page 9) defines deposit 
insurance as „an explicit or implicit system which guarantees that an amount promised 
to depositors will be paid to all of them who withdraw“: It is thus simply assumed that 
a well-specified scheme exists, and that it makes no major difference whether it is 
                                                 
4 Moreover, the exact nature of the scheme (flat versus risk-adjusted premiums) and of accompanying 
regulations (deposit rate regulation, investment restrictions) will strongly influence the results. 
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formally laid down in law.5 For our purpose, however, it is central to make such a 
distinction, since we are interested in the effects of making DI explicit. In a next step, 
we therefore characterize implicit (section 1.2) and explicit (section 1.3) arrangements. 
Moreover, as discussed above, many theoretical studies suggest that the existence and 
the design of a certain arrangement may be endogenous. For this reason, section III 
discusses potential determinants of observed phenotypes of depositor protection. 
1.2 Banking without (explicit) depositor protection  
As a starting point, we look at an economy without any depositor protection, be it 
explicit or implicit. Even in such an environment, bank managers face several 
incentives to take excessive risks, in particular due to limited liability constraints and the 
fact that their performance is partly unobservable. If performance can be observed, 
depositors will take certain measures to prevent risk taking, either by charging higher 
deposit rates or by intervening in the bank. For example, intervention can take the form 
of “fundamentals-based” runs which serve as a mechanism to sort out weak banks or to 
implement an efficient risk sharing arrangement (Allen and Gale, 1998). 
Two distinct coordination problems arise in this context. The first one stresses the 
inability of small depositors to effectively monitor the bank’s management 
(Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994): If the course of action cannot be completely specified 
in advance (contracts are incomplete) it is possible to implement an ex post efficient 
solution by sensibly choosing the financial structure of the bank. In good states of the 
world, control rights will be allocated to agents that favor risk (shareholders), in bad 
states, depositors with a concave payoff function will be in charge. The latter, however, 
may not be able to effectively defend there interests, since they are dispersed and often 
uninformed. Consequently, they lack the ability to avoid the free rider problem 
associated with monitoring and the competence to judge performance appropriately. 
They therefore have to be represented by a regulatory agency, even in the absence of a 
deposit guarantee. 
Two conclusions for further consideration arise from this analysis: First, even in the 
absence of deposit insurance, there is scope for insufficient depositor monitoring. As a consequence, 
some form of depositor representation/bank supervision is warranted. Second, attempts 
to foster private monitoring of banks by small depositors seem to be less fruitful than attempts to 
encourage participation by large, possibly wholesale stakeholders. Indeed, one rationale for 
introducing explicit deposit insurance is exactly to strengthen market discipline by 
limiting coverage ratios or by excluding certain types of deposits and depositors. 
The second coordination problem emphasizes the fact that bank runs do not need to 
be based on fundamentals (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Due to their sometimes self-
fulfilling nature, they expose the economy to potentially significant risks: Early 
liquidation of long term assets will be costly, and contagion to other banks and financial 
markets can result in a systemic crisis. These costs can be avoided by issuing a deposit 
guarantee. Even if the government refuses to issue a formal guarantee, politico-
economic considerations combined with the potentially high costs of systemic risk will 
generate the perception of implicit guarantees: For example, if an institution possesses 
specific characteristics that strongly increase societies expected cost due to a failure, its 
managers will always attach some positive probability to the event of being bailed out. 
                                                 
5 An exception is the paper by Gropp and Vesala (2004), which we discuss below. 
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The most prominent examples are the so called “too-big-“ and “too-complex-to fail” 
problems: Fearing the systemic consequences of intervention or closure, a bank is 
allowed to keep operating even though it should be closed. Moreover, if several 
institutions fail at the same time, considerations of systemic risk again will play a central 
role in the authorities approach to intervention (the “too-many-to-fail-problem”). Last 
but not least, there will always be strong politico-economic pressures to bail out 
depositors in the event of a failure. To conclude, the reasons giving rise to implicit 
guarantees are manifold. They range from welfare-maximizing considerations to purely 
opportunistic behavior. Another rationale for the introduction of explicit schemes is 
therefore to make the objectives of a deposit guarantee transparent. 
It is important to note that most of the mechanisms leading to implicit guarantees 
imply asymmetric bail-out schemes. Such asymmetries are obvious in the presence of 
“too-big-“ and “too-complex-to fail” problems. However, there are other 
circumstances in which they are likely to be important. For example, a specific bank 
might be considered a national champion. Alternatively, some banks might be 
government-owned. Moreover, the failure of a specific institution is considered 
intolerable because of its role as lenders to specific industries or provider of payments 
services to a large number of very small depositors. Finally, stakeholders of different 
banks might differ in the extent of their political influence. In sum, the asymmetry of 
bail-out guarantees is one of the central characteristics of implicit regimes. Therefore, 
many proponents of legally formalized regimes argue that explicit deposit insurance 
might be a precondition for (a) providing a level playing field and (b) for effectively 
encouraging the entry of small banks. 
Besides being asymmetric in nature, implicit regimes exhibit further particularities. For 
example, depositor compensations will depend more strongly on specific circumstances than in a 
formalized regime. Among other things, the magnitude of financial assistance to the 
banking sector will depend on the fiscal situation (in case of a public bailout) or the 
state of surviving banks (in case of an industry solution). The resulting uncertainty might 
leave considerable room for depositor runs. This has several implications. On the one hand, 
market discipline, risk-sharing and reputation-building by banks could be encouraged. This would 
then reduce the necessary scope for public intervention in the financial system. On the 
other hand, the frequency of individual bankruptcies and the likelihood of contagion might increase. 
If this is the case, it is likely that other safety net arrangements gain in importance. For 
example, the central bank as Lender-of-Last-Resort might become a much more 
prominent player: Since deposit insurance as one of the “circuit breakers”6 of the 
financial safety net is less effective, other means of crisis management gain in 
importance. 
Finally, it is important to distinguish (implicit) depositor protection and implicit 
guarantees for other bank stakeholders. Both are related, since even an implicit safety 
net partly eliminates the undesirable equilibrium of a pure speculative run. As a 
consequence, depositors’ monitoring incentives are softened. Other disciplining devices 
have to be set in place, typically in the form of the implementation of capital adequacy 
regulation and supervisory intervention.7 However, economic theory and recent 
                                                 
6 Herring and Santomero, 2000 
7 In fact, both coordination problems mentioned above stress the need for some form of substitute for 
depositor monitoring even in the absence of explicit DI. The first one argues that depositor monitoring 
will be limited even in the absence of a guarantee. The second one derives it from the need to operate 
some form of safety net arrangement. 
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experience shows that such substitutes will be limited in their effectiveness. This leads 
to the perception that the scope for a replacement of the management or a haircut for 
shareholders is quite narrow. To start with, the politico-economic considerations as well 
as the “too-big-to-fail”-, “too-complex-to-fail” and “too-many-to-fail”-clauses 
mentioned above also apply to these classes of stakeholders. In addition, a number of 
further reasons can be mentioned: 
 The objective function of supervisors might differ from the social objective 
function, leading to conflicts of interest and regulatory capture. For example, 
supervisors might want to develop a long-term relationship with the supervised to 
increase their job market opportunities. Alternatively, they may aim at developing a 
reputation for quality. If the public is incompletely informed about the latter, 
supervisors might fear to give a false signal by admitting a bank has to be closed, 
preferring to gamble for resurrection together with the bank (Boot and Thakor, 
1993). 
 The legal and supervisory preconditions might bias supervisory incentives towards 
forbearance. The supply of expertise for bank and corporate restructuring might be 
limited, causing authorities to delay intervention (Ingves, 2002). Furthermore, the 
protection from lawsuits after intervention might be insufficient.  
 Even if a supervisor’s incentives are perfectly aligned with the social objective 
function, political authorities might interfere to defend their own interests. A 
multitude of reasons can lead to political interference, ranging from concerns of re-
election when a crisis is recognized to early to direct industry influences on political 
decision making.  
 Finally, some conflicts of interest leading to forbearance are rooted in the nature of 
banking itself. These inherent characteristics of banks may create a wedge between 
ex ante and ex post optimality. Ex ante, the threat of closure and intervention is 
important to limit risk-taking. Ex post, it might be optimal to recapitalize banks 
with viable relationships.8 Alternatively, tough bailout policies can have 
“counterproductive effects on bank managers incentives” to disclose loan losses.9 
As a consequence of these mechanisms, not only depositors will assign a positive 
probability to the event of not suffering the consequences of a failure. An interesting 
question is whether and how the introduction of an explicit scheme influences 
expectations of these parties, in particular managers and shareholders. For example, in 
an analysis of the Argentinean experience, de la Torre (2000) argues that the 
introduction of explicit deposit insurance has considerably changed (and improved) 
resolution procedures and exit mechanisms.  
To conclude, implicit protection schemes can be characterized as institutional 
frameworks implying a set of bailout expectations for depositors, shareholder and 
managers of different banks. Each stakeholder group j of each bank i will attach some 
positive probability jip  of not loosing its stake in the bank in case of a problem. In 
addition, there will be group-specific maximum coverage amount, jiC . Until the 1970s, 
most safety net arrangements could be characterized in this way: In some countries, the 
government publicly stated that depositors’ losses would be borne by the taxpayer. In 
                                                 
8 See Diamond (2001) and Diamond and Rajan (2001). 
9 Aghion, Bolton and Fries, 1999, p. 51. 
 13
other cases, safety nets simply consisted of public perceptions that depositors would 
not be held responsible for the mismanagement of (often government owned) banks. 
The introduction of an explicit scheme will lead to a revision of these expectations. We 
will discuss the nature and the potential consequences of such a step in the next 
section. 
1.3 Effects of introducing explicit deposit insurance 
When an explicit scheme is introduced, authorities will publicly announce a maximum 
coverage level jiC  for deposits that is equal for all banks i. It will typically range from 0 
for holders of inter-bank deposits, subordinated debt or for shareholders, to a specific 
positive amount for small depositors. At the same time, they will state that jip  (the 
probability of being bailed out) will be 1 for small depositors. When the scheme is 
introduced during normal times (times without major distress in the banking system), 
politicians will try to signal that the probability for other groups has been significantly 
reduced. Naturally, these announcements will never be fully credible. The most 
important question is therefore: How are expectations updated after the insurance 
scheme has been enacted? We argue that explicit arrangements will possess three 
important characteristics: 
 Legal formalization of depositor compensation procedures, 
 Availability of additional instruments and rules, and 
 Reduced scope for asymmetric bail-outs 
These characteristics will (together with a set of preconditions) finally determine the 
consequences of the decision to make depositor protection explicit. 
1.3.1 Legal Specification of Depositor Compensation 
The most obvious effect of a transition from an implicit to an explicit regime is the 
adoption of a legal framework for depositor compensation (characteristic). In systems 
where the rule of law is established (precondition), such a legal guarantee will reduce 
uncertainty concerning a bail-out (consequence), especially for small depositors: While a 
legal specification does not completely eliminate constructive ambiguity, it limits its 
scope. Moreover, the degree of flexibility is possibly reduced: Compensations for 
depositors will be less dependent on the availability of funds and/or the economic (and 
political) importance of the groups being affected by a bank failure. 
To further investigate the consequences of a legal specification, it is necessary to 
distinguish between different groups. We start with smaller, individual depositors. With 
a legal right to compensation, a complete haircut will prove to be difficult, setting a 
lower limit to Dip  and 
D
iC , where D stands for depositors. As a result, the risk 
sensitivity of certain deposit rates will decrease. Whether this is a source of concern 
depends on the monitoring capacity of small depositors and on the effectiveness of 
other monitoring arrangements. At the same time, the lower bound to small depositors’ 
bail-out expectations will eliminate uncoordinated runs, which is the single most 
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important purpose of the new policy.10 If the possibly hazardous consequences of bank 
panics are large and runs are sufficiently likely, the new legal arrangement may indeed 
deliver significant benefits. The latter are twofold. First, the costs accruing in case of an 
actual panic (contagion to other intermediaries and markets, liquidation of long-term 
projects, loss of relationship capital and disintermediation) are avoided. Second, there 
may be costs of the mere possibility of a panic in the future. In particular, banking 
systems with a very low level of depositor confidence are often characterized by a 
reluctance to deposit money in banks. If explicit deposit insurance contributes to a 
stabilization of expectations, it may increase the willingness to channel funds through 
financial intermediation.  
For large depositors and other stakeholders, the consequences could be quite different: 
Politicians planning to raise the coverage level above the legally specified amount will 
now have to defend their decision against a well-specified target level. Indeed, one of 
the major objectives of most explicit scheme is to limit the scope for widespread bail-
outs. Whether this objective (the “credibility” of the scheme) can be achieved depends 
on a number of preconditions.11 Most importantly, in countries were the rule of law is 
established, a formally specified system should provide a certain degree of 
accountability. Moreover, the interplay between the political environment and the 
banking industry will be a decisive element in determining bail-out expectations. In 
particular, a credible commitment to limited coverage is difficult to achieve in banking 
systems that have a close relationship to the government. Among other things, the 
degree of government ownership of banks, the importance of connected lending 
practices and the political influence of large stakeholders will be important determinants 
of the credibility of an explicit limit on coverage. 
To conclude, the legal formalization of depositor compensation involves substantial 
trade-offs: On the one hand, runs will be less likely, which may increase the system’s 
resilience to shocks and its’ potential to absorb savings. On the other hand, if former 
implicit arrangements continue to co-exist with the now larger certainty for small 
depositors, risk-taking incentives may increase. The most important precondition for an 
effective introduction of explicit deposit insurance is thus that the government can 
credibly signal its intention to limit coverage. Gropp and Vesala (2004) formalize this 
general idea in a stylized model. Among other things, they show that an explicit scheme 
may indeed reduce the tendency for excessive risk-taking, provided that, ceteris paribus, 
the share of credibly uninsured liabilities (e.g. subordinated debt) is sufficiently high. 
Moreover, they emphasize the role of the counterfactual (i.e. the generosity of the 
implicit safety net) in determining the impact of the new regime. 
1.3.2 Availability of Additional Instruments 
Together with a legal guarantee, nearly all explicit schemes comprise additional 
instruments, rules and regulations: For example, the funding of depositor compensation 
is formalized. In addition, risks that could not be taken into account before can now be 
                                                 
10 In contrast, if financial crises are “optimal” (as in Allen and Gale, 1998) or the only alternative to 
provide proper incentives to bank managers and borrowers (as in Diamond and Rajan, 2001) this is an 
undesirable outcome. 
11 Note that, at this stage, we only discuss the extension of bail-outs to stakeholders of an arbitrarily 
chosen bank. The implications of explicit schemes for an asymmetric treatment of the same group within 
different types of banks will be discussed below. 
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priced, using risk-adjusted premiums. Moreover, many countries introduce a new 
agency with extensive mandates in the area of bank supervision and resolution. Quite 
often, other areas of the financial safety net are reshaped when the explicit scheme is 
introduced. All these measures have the potential to attenuate or to aggravate risk-
taking. While we do not provide an extensive discussion of all instruments12, we want to 
highlight several of their potential implications, using funding arrangements and the 
reconfiguration of safety net structure as examples: We show that a potential advantage 
of explicit deposit insurance is that it allows for specific procedures not available within 
an implicit scheme. However, it is not a priori clear whether a specific design feature 
will increase or decrease the probability of experiencing a systemic crisis. Thus, the 
desirability of a specific design again depends on several preconditions. 
One of the central characteristics of explicit insurance schemes is that financing 
patterns are formalized. In most cases, banks are expected to “pre-fund” the scheme. 
The fact that ex ante funding is the preferred policy stands in sharp contrast to many 
recent commentaries, arguing that this practice aggravates the problem of moral hazard 
(see, for example, Demigurc-Kunt and Kane, 2002): Since funds are already “ear-
marked” for insolvency resolution, pre-funding might give depositors a (false) sense of 
safety. Moreover, past contributions might be considered as sunk, decreasing the 
propensity of banks to participate in peer monitoring. 
However, pre-funding does have some obvious benefits. In particular, it allows for a 
prompt reimbursement of depositors, preventing the possibility of a loss of confidence 
due to delayed compensations. In principle, this objective could also be achieved by 
offering a line of credit to the DIS. However, such an arrangement might prove to be 
dynamically inconsistent: Since bank failures often occur in a situation of weak 
macroeconomic fundamentals, banks could try to renegotiate the terms and conditions 
of payment. Closely related, there might be pro-cyclical effects, since levies will have to 
be raised in situations were balance sheets have already deteriorated. In contrast, levying 
premiums over a longer period allows for smoothing payments over the business cycle. 
Given these arguments for and against pre-funding, it is tempting to boil down the 
issue to a simple trade-off between moral hazard and run prevention. There are several 
reasons why things are more complicated. As noted by Roy (2000, p. 4), “collecting 
premiums ex ante requires establishing rules and fosters transparency and information 
sharing. As an administrative body that has a fiduciary capacity, a deposit insurer is 
naturally lead to exercise some degree of supervision, which in turn improves risk 
measurement and risk control“.13 Importantly, this will facilitate the use of risk-adjusted 
premiums. In fact, one powerful argument for an explicit scheme is that it principally 
allows for such a policy. As explained above, risk-based premiums have the potential to 
attenuate problems of excessive risk-taking. While their feasibility and desirability may 
                                                 
12 Beck (2003), Frolov (2004), Garcia (1999), Hoelscher, Klüh and Taylor (2005) as well as Lee and Kwok 
(2000) provide a comprehensive discussion of design issues. Coburn and O’Keefe (2003), Madan and 
Pennacchi  (2003) and Suphap (2004) discuss practices to price risk, Roy (2003) deals with fundig 
alternatives. Bennett (2001) compares approaches to failure resolution and asset liquidation.  
13 Indeed, there is evidence that pre-funded schemes are more rule-based than those relying on ex post 
contributions (see Garcia, 1999). 
 16
be limited in situations of imperfect information, they certainly have a role to play in 
the overall toolbox of banking regulation.14 
Less obviously, the availability of an established fund may increase the willingness of 
authorities to intervene in weak banks. For self-interested bureaucrats and politicians, 
the costs of admitting the existence of a problem and arranging funds to compensate 
depositors may outweigh the benefits of timely intervention (Boot and Thakor, 1993). 
While this is true for any system, an existing fund facilitates intervention during non-
systemic events. In addition, it forces the responsible institution to regularly compare its 
(mostly implicit) liabilities with available assets. By making expected losses, assets and 
liabilities explicit, an additional element of accountability is introduced. The frequently 
observed tendency to cover up implicit costs to the taxpayer may thus be attenuated. 
This line of thinking brings us back to an important aspect of explicit deposit insurance. 
For several reasons, the introduction of a scheme may not only change depositors’ 
perceptions, but also the expectations of other bank stakeholders. Very often, a new 
safety net player with the narrow mandate to limit the exposure of the fund is set up. 
Furthermore, the process of preparing the introduction of a scheme is often used to 
review other aspects of safety net design, like the appropriateness of the supervisory 
process. Whether these measures will lead to a more prudent behavior will finally 
depend on specific country circumstances. It is not unreasonable, however, that the 
mere process of preparing a new legal framework sensitizes politicians and the public 
for the challenges posed by financial fragility and moral hazard.  
Since there are good arguments for and against pre-funding and premium 
differentiation, the final impact of these measures will again depend on the 
preconditions under which a scheme is introduced. For pre-funding to be feasible, the 
banking system needs to display a minimum level of stability and coherence. Moreover, 
the complexity of managing such a scheme is much larger, creating a demand for 
further rules (concerning fund targets, investment restrictions etc.) and resources. 
Likewise, risk-based premiums require exact supervisory information. The latter must 
be obtained in a timely manner and processed using quite sophisticated techniques. 
This, in turn, necessitates a substantial level of supervisory quality and coordination 
among safety net participants. Finally, fair pricing of deposit insurance may require 
changing other functions of the FSN. For example, prompt corrective action might be 
necessary, since undercapitalized banks may be tempted to gamble for resurrection in 
the time span between a bank’s risk choice and the premium adjustment.15 An effective 
intervention policy is needed to prevent such actions. The latter is a general 
requirement for a functioning safety net, but is particularly important in explicit, risk-
adjusted schemes. 
1.3.3 Reduced Scope for Asymmetric Bail-Out Policies 
Finally, the explicit scheme will reduce the scope for asymmetric bail-out policies. While 
it is unlikely that bailout expectations will equalize across all banks (since “too-big-to-
fail”-considerations will still be prevalent) the likelihood of being protected will increase 
unambiguously for depositors of small banks. For larger banks, expected relative 
increases in p and C will be smaller, or even negative, in particular if the explicit scheme 
                                                 
14 An interesting application of that general idea was recently brought forward by Pennacchi (2004), who 
shows that the pro-cyclical effects of risk-based capital standards are likely to be larger than those of risk-
adjusted deposit insurance. Consequently, he proposes to combine the two elements. 
15 Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1992). 
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has the stated objective to level the playing field. Since much of the recent literature 
emphasizes the close relationship between market structure and different safety net 
arrangements, we believe that reduced asymmetry should be regarded as a central 
feature of explicit regimes.  
What are the likely consequences of a more equal treatment of all banks? Without 
referring to the distinction between “implicit” and “explicit”, Hakanes and Schnabel 
(2004) provide some answers to this question. They show that asymmetric bail-out 
guarantees can strongly influence risk-taking incentives and market structure. In 
particular, a situation where selected (“large”) banks are protected more heavily than 
others might lead to excessive risk-taking by small banks. The idea is that an 
asymmetric guarantee will depress margins at small banks, which induces them to 
choose riskier projects. The effects on risk-taking by large banks will be ambiguous. On 
the one hand, the asymmetric guarantee will increase charter values, leading to a more 
prudent investment behavior. On the other hand, a higher bail-out probability will 
intensify the problems caused by the put option character of risk-insensitive deposit 
insurance. 
These considerations highlight an issue that was already raised above: The desire to 
encourage competition may go hand in hand with a necessity to introduce a formalized 
scheme. If an asymmetric guarantee leads to excessive risk-taking by small banks, and 
(in the extreme), to a highly concentrated market structure, the only way to level the 
playing field (and to attenuate small banks’ risk profile) might be to provide some legal 
protection for all banks. However, it is worth noting that such a policy will be of very 
limited success if close relations between the government and specific banks remain.  
To sum up, the three characteristics of explicit deposit insurance (legal formalization, 
availability of additional instruments, and reduced scope for asymmetric bail-outs) 
imply that the policy of introducing a scheme has benefits and costs. The net effect will 
largely depend on a set of preconditions. One of the most important questions faced by 
country authorities contemplating the introduction of a DIS is thus whether the 
macroeconomic environment, the economy as a whole, the banking system and the 
supervisory and regulatory framework support such a step. Whether this was the case in 
recent decades is an empirical question, an issue we discuss next. 
2. Recent Empirical Work on Deposit Insurance Schemes 
Recent years saw a strong growth in the number of econometric studies evaluating the 
economic consequences of introducing Deposit Insurance Schemes (DIS). Demirgüç-
Kunt and Kane (2002) review this literature. In their view, an assessment of empirical 
evidence yields the following main conclusions: 
 Explicit deposit insurance increases the risk of experiencing a systemic crisis. In 
proper institutional environments, this effect becomes weaker, but is still 
significant. 
 Country authorities operating an existing scheme should consider funding their DIS 
ex post and to introduce co-insurance, lower coverage levels and apply a restrictive 
concept of eligibility, excluding inter-bank and foreign currency deposits from 
coverage. 
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 The reason why pre-funded explicit schemes with broad coverage exhibit a higher 
crisis probability is that they discourage private monitoring by small depositors and 
market discipline. 
 According to cross-country studies, deposit insurance is impedimental to financial 
market development and deepening. 
Overall, Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (henceforth: D-K) arrive at a very pessimistic 
conclusion concerning the desirability of an explicit DIS. Consequently, the authors 
state that “officials in many countries should close their ears to the siren call of explicit 
deposit insurance” (p. 192). Even though the authors point out that the research 
summarized “by no means implies that all countries with explicit systems should close 
them down at the first opportunity”, several of their findings (for example concerning 
the desirability of pre-funded schemes) stand in sharp contrast to earlier assessments of 
best practice and deposit insurance design (see Garcia, 1999). Because of this 
discrepancy, we will first give our own account of the literature, taking their results as a 
starting point. 
Building on the results of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), D-K argue that 
increased risk taking due to explicit DI manifests itself in an increased probability of 
experiencing a systemic crisis. While a strong institutional environment (proxied by 
measures of bureaucratic quality, lack of corruption, contract enforcement and legal 
efficiency interacted with deposit insurance variables) mitigates the effects to a certain 
degree (interaction terms are negative and significant), DI still significantly increases 
bank fragility. While the authors perform various robustness tests16, this conclusion is 
not replicated in many other binary models of banking crises. For instance, 
Eichengreen and Arteta (2000), in an attempt to consolidate recent work on the 
determinants of banking crises, find that the effect of explicit schemes is highly 
sensitive to the use of different crisis lists, deposit insurance series, and the exclusion of 
several types of countries. A particularly striking feature is that the exclusion of OECD 
countries weakens the effect of deposit insurance on crises probability, since OECD 
countries are expected to have a contract environment favorable to a DIS.17 The 
authors conclude that ”there is at least as much evidence that deposit insurance has 
favorable effects ... as that it destabilizes banking systems...” (p. 25). In fact, this 
statement is reinforced when other binary studies are taken into account: Glick and 
Hutchinson (1999) do not find a significant effect, Hutchinson and McDill (1998) do, 
and in particular when deposit insurance is interacted with a variable measuring 
financial liberalization. The same ambiguity is present in earlier studies on U.S. data: 
While Thies and Gerlowski (1989) find a positive relationship between bank failure 
rates and deposit insurance, Karels and McClatchy (1999) and Wheelock and Wilson 
(1994) do not find a stable relation. 
Besides analyzing the consequences of introducing an explicit DIS, D-K discuss the 
appropriate use of specific design features. Since “even in favorable circumstances, 
deposit insurance impacts financial fragility by reducing the degree of market 
                                                 
16 Robustness tests include a two-stage procedure to control for the possibility that countries with weak 
banking systems are more likely to introduce a DIS, the use of a principal component measure of moral 
hazard instead of the deposit insurance characteristics, and the inclusion of other variables characterizing 
the banking system. 
17 Note that this result depends on the way explanatory variables are weighted to account for 
measurement errors. 
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discipline”, country authorities are advised to use “appropriate design features...to 
control and offset these effects”. Indeed, the results of Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2002) imply that most practices having the potential to foster private 
monitoring should also be adopted: Membership should be compulsory, coverage levels 
should be set at very low levels, most types of depositors and deposits (in particular 
foreign currency and inter-bank claims) should be excluded and co-insurance should be 
introduced. In addition, authorities should not participate in the funding of the DIS and 
involve the private sector in the management and administration of the Deposit 
Insurance Agency (DIA). Finally, the practice of pre-funding the system should be 
abandoned to secure that the pool of explicit liquid reserves is held small. 
While further econometric evidence is scarce when it comes to specific design features, 
the few existing studies mostly support these claims, however with some exceptions on 
specific issues. For example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) find that market 
monitoring increases when foreign currency deposits are covered. Similarly, Cull, 
Senbet and Sorge (2004) have to drop the foreign currency dummy when calculating a 
principal component index of “generosity of deposit insurance coverage”. 
Notwithstanding this evidence, some of the proposals mentioned above stand in sharp 
contrast to earlier evaluations of best practice (see Garcia, 2000). 
What is the channel through which explicit deposit insurance increases banking 
fragility? D-K argue that an explicit scheme will be detrimental to private monitoring 
efforts, thus weakening market discipline. Before we turn to existing empirical evidence 
for this proposition, it is useful to recall that recent theories of banking regulation 
provide very different answers to this (superficially uncontroversial) question. 
Specifically, as argued in the seminal contribution by Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), 
small depositors are often uninformed and suffer from a coordination problem, thus 
lacking the incentives to acquire the necessary information to discipline banks 
effectively. According to this theory, the additional effect of making depositor claims 
less secure should be small.18 Hence, one of the central questions is to what extend 
small depositors do efficiently monitor banks (see below). 
Moreover, while it is obvious that the presence of a safety net will influence agent’s 
risk-taking incentives, it is less clear whether explicit deposit insurance does so in a well-
defined way. As mentioned above, the monitoring and risk-taking effects of making 
deposit insurance explicit will strongly depend on a-priori expectations of bank bailout 
policies and the way these expectations are updated when formal rules to payout 
depositors are introduced. An import implication for empirical research on DIS is that 
preconditions probably matter more than individual design features. In fact, the lack of 
appropriate control variables to account for such preconditions (government 
involvement in the banking system, market concentration, quality of regulatory and 
supervisory policies) is one of the most pronounced challenges and weaknesses of 
existing econometric studies on the effects of introducing an explicit scheme. In this 
respect, it should be noted that the majority of studies (including Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2002) seriously try to account for such preconditions. However, since the 
relevant data is only available for single points in time, estimations have to be carried 
out under the assumption that the characteristic value was constant over the last 20 to 
25 years. 
                                                 
18 In addition, making small depositors responsible fort he safety of their claims involves a duplication of 
monitoring costs.  
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Keeping this limitation in mind, it is nonetheless useful to ask whether recent 
econometric studies provide a clear picture about risk-taking incentives in the presence 
of explicit DI. Based on a summary of the growing literature on the effectiveness of 
private monitoring in attenuating banks’ risk taking incentives, D-K conclude that 
depositors lacking insurance coverage indeed exert such market discipline. In contrast, 
there is indirect evidence that the introduction of an explicit DIS will hamper market 
discipline, since small depositors will loose their incentive to privately discipline banks. 
Most of the studies cited to underpin this line of reasoning use U.S. data (Flannery, 
1998, provides an extensive survey of the relevant literature), a country with a relatively 
high coverage level relative to GDP and with a highly developed financial system. As a 
consequence, it is not clear whether the results carry over to other environments.19 
Indeed, Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) find that depositors in Argentina, Chile 
and Mexico intensively disciplined banks during the 1980s and 1990s, and that deposit 
insurance did not significantly diminish the extent of market discipline.20 In contrast, 
the work by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) reaches the opposite conclusion. The 
authors use a sample of up to 2500 banks in 43 countries to examine how bank 
characteristics influence the interest cost and the growth rate of deposits for banks 
operating in countries with or without an explicit DIS. They find that an explicit 
scheme indeed lowers the sensitivity of banks’ interest rate expenses to changes in risk 
profiles. Emphasizing the design features mentioned above, the measures believed to 
strengthen market discipline (ex post funding, co-insurance, restrictive coverage) turn 
out to do so in the given sample. 
Gropp and Vesala (2004), also using bank-level data, come to a very different 
conclusion. In their sample of 128 banks in 15 European countries, it appears that 
introducing explicit deposit insurance reduced the risk-taking of banks. The authors 
argue that, by making the safety net partly explicit, European authorities were able to 
effectively reduce the expected public subsidy in case of failures. While the observed 
effect might be partially due to other factors (like the increased perception that 
European competition policy will serve as a watchdog, effectively discouraging 
inadequate bail-out policies in member countries, or the fact that the countries that had 
introduced DI in the period under study had experienced a systemic crisis shortly 
before, causing authorities and depositors to be especially vigilant), the analysis includes 
some interesting features new to the empirical literature on safety net design. In 
particular, the authors estimate whether certain bank characteristics lead to a different 
reaction when a DIS is introduced. It turns out that institutions having lower charter 
values and a higher share of subordinated debt reinforce the risk-mitigating effect of 
explicitly reducing coverage. In contrast, very large banks do not change their policies 
in reaction to deposit insurance. This latter result points to the importance of an 
integrated view on the safety net and the way it shapes incentives.21 
                                                 
19 Moreover, the question whether private depositors price risks adequately has to be assessed for 
instruments that are normally hold by wealthy, sophisticated investors, for example certificates of 
deposits or deposits exceeding the coverage limit of U.S. $100,000. 
20 It is worth noting that these countries had experienced financial fragility in the period under study. 
Consequently, depositors might have been particularly aware of the fragility of banks, causing them to 
closely monitor their banks performance. Indeed, the authors fund such an effect in the data.   
21 The relation between charter values, bank size and deposit insurance is well established in the 
literature. 
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To conclude, it is difficult to come to a firm conclusion regarding the effectiveness of 
private monitoring and the consequences of explicit DI on banks’ risk taking incentives. 
Depositors seem to rationally respond to bank performance in most circumstances, in 
particular when they are not covered by a DIS. However, this does not rule out 
uncoordinated runs in the sense of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). It is important to see 
that this trade-off cannot be easily resolved. Most importantly, proponents of making 
the safety net partly explicit do not claim that depositors’ incentives will be unaffected. 
They rather argue that the benefits of preventing runs outweigh the costs in terms of 
weaker market discipline, if and only if the latter can be substituted by appropriate 
regulation and supervision. This brings us back to the issue of preconditions mentioned 
above. Since one of the central rationales for the public surveillance of financial 
institutions is exactly the necessity of providing some form of safety net, any such 
arrangement will need to be accompanied by proper institutions that monitor and 
discipline intermediaries. A central question for future empirical research is thus how 
financial systems react to explicit deposit insurance under different supervisory regimes.   
Finally, recent empirical work on deposit insurance has expanded to several new 
directions. We will only cover them briefly: 
 First, turning to the effects of explicit DI on financial market development, D-K 
refer to cross-country studies asking whether explicit DI is conducive to financial 
development. Citing the contributions of Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001), Cull, 
Senbet and Sorge (2000) and Cecchetti and Krause (2000) it is argued that the 
opposite is true. Since the focus of this literature review is on the relation between 
financial stability and financial safety net design, we refer the reader to the original 
articles. 
 Second, an interesting line of research tries to analyze the likelihood that a specific 
country adopts an explicit DIS. In fact, this question bears some importance for the 
issues discussed above, since it may well be the case that countries prone to 
financial fragility are also prone to adopt DIS. Laeven (2003) studies long run 
determinants of adoption probability, using a cross-country approach. He finds that 
countries with a large proportion of elderly people, a high share of small banks and 
poor creditor rights, are most likely to adopt a DIS. However, he dismisses the 
possibility that financial fragility is a determinant of the adoption probability, based 
on the observation that only 26 countries of his sample (36%) adopted an explicit 
scheme within three years following a banking crisis (a number appearing quite high 
to us), while 8 countries (10%) experienced a crisis three years following the 
adoption of a DIS (a number that could either express the adverse consequences of 
explicit insurance or anticipation of future distress in a fragile environment). We 
nonetheless believe that it would be important to further investigate this issue. In 
particular, it could well be the case that the desire to stabilize confidence in weak 
banking systems was much more important for recent adopters than for early 
schemes (see below). 
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III. Conceptual Problems and Econometric Approach 
Before turning to our own account of the relation between safety net design, deposit 
insurance and financial fragility, it is useful to consider some major methodological 
challenges. Since Santor (2003) discusses many of the problems in detail, taking deposit 
insurance as one example, I concentrate on a short description of the issues most 
relevant for the study on hand (see also Eichengreen and Arteta, 2000): I first consider 
the potential for a selection bias, i.e. the problem that countries may “select to be 
treated” with explicit depositor protection for reasons related to financial fragility. 
Furthermore, I discuss problems of reverse causality, in particular concerning 
macroeconomic control variables, data availability, measurement error, and sample 
selection. Each section contains a short description of the way this study deals with 
potential distortions resulting from these factors. 
1. Selection Bias 
For the study on hand, the most pressing problems arise from a possible selection bias. 
In particular, the decision to adopt an explicit DIS is not a random treatment, but a 
conscious decision of policymakers facing a certain set of financial, economic and 
politico-economic circumstances. In our survey of the theoretical literature, we already 
mentioned that a number of recent contributions emphasize that specific developments 
might lead to the introduction of a scheme: 
 More fragmented and competitive banking systems display a higher likelihood of 
experiencing a crisis, especially after financial liberalization. This, in turn, might 
increase the perceived need to protect depositors and sound banks, the latter 
fearing liquidation as a result of contagion. While industry solutions may 
endogenously emerge, they could be less likely in a situation of growing 
fragmentation (Hasanalyev, 2004), inducing the government to step in. 
 Moreover, the desire to strengthen competition itself may induce politicians to 
introduce an explicit scheme. Many of the theoretical contributions reviewed 
above include corner solutions in which an insufficiently (or asymmetrically) 
protected banking system ends up with an overly concentrated market structure. 
Policies to strengthen competition might thus go hand in hand with the 
introduction of an explicit arrangement. 
 Finally, weak banking systems might experience problems of under-depositing in 
equilibrium. To stabilize depositor confidence, a government might be tempted 
to provide a certain level of protection. Indeed, recent experiences show that a 
relatively large number of explicit schemes were introduced after major banking 
sector problems or after a prolonged period of low depositor confidence (see 
below).  
To explain the nature of the problem from an econometric perspective, it is useful to 
describe it in terms of a standard treatment model. In our case, the treatment is the 
adoption of a deposit insurance scheme, represented by a dummy variable DI that takes 
the value of 1 if the country has in fact adopted a scheme and 0 otherwise. In addition, 
let Y1 be the outcome variable of interest for an individual country that has received the 
treatment (has adopted explicit DI). The variable Y0 represents the outcome variable 
for the same country, if it had not adopted an explicit scheme. The objective is to 
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determine the mean difference in the crisis probability that results from the fact that a 
country has implemented the policy instead of abstaining from it. This mean difference 
(the Average Effect of Treatment on the Treated, or ATT) can be formally expressed 
as: 
)1()1()1( 0101 =−===− DIYEDIYEDIYYE       (1.) 
Obviously, the last term in equation (x.x) cannot be observed, because it represents the 
mean value of the outcome variable for a country with deposit insurance, had it not 
adopted a scheme. With non-experimental data, it is therefore necessary to find an 
appropriate control group to calculate the ATT. However, the choice of this group is a 
non-trivial task, since the decision to adopt a DIS (to select to be treated) is not a 
random event and may be influenced by factors that also impact the probability of 
experiencing a systemic crisis: Countries with and without a scheme are different along 
dimensions that are related to the outcome variable. As a result, the expected value of 
the outcome variable for countries without deposit insurance is not a reliable estimator 
for the outcome variable of a treated country, had it not chosen to be treated: 
)1()0( 00 =≠= DIYEDIYE        (2.) 
The treatment effect estimated in most econometric models of banking crises: 
)0()1( 01 =−= DIYEDIYE         (3.) 
is therefore potentially plagued with a selection bias. For example, the introduction of 
an explicit scheme may be an endogenous response to the new financial environment 
characterized by more competition, lower charter values and an increased exposure to 
volatile capital flows. 
To show that this consideration may indeed influence the results, Table 2 reports 
correlation coefficients between the moral hazard index of DKD and different 
measures of banking concentration and financial liberalization. The moral hazard index 
is constructed using principal component analysis and contains information on several 
deposit insurance design features (mode of funding, coverage of inter-bank and foreign 
currency deposits, existence of coinsurance). The first column is taken from Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) who use a sample very similar to that of DKD. The 
second and third columns are calculated using our own sample. As can be seen from 
the table, the moral hazard index as well as the DI dummy is indeed strongly correlated 
with most of the respective variables: It thus becomes more likely to observe an explicit 
deposit insurance scheme in financial systems that become less concentrated and more 
liberalized. 
 Beck, Demiguc-
Kunt, Levine 
Own Sample 
(Index/Dummy) 
  Whole Sample Excluding OECD 
countries 
Concentration -0.40 -0.21/-0.46 -0.22/-0.44 
Fraction of Entry denied -0.24 -/- -/- 
Activity Restrictions  -0.25 -/- -/- 
Financial Liberalization -/- 0.13/0.29 0.12/0.21 
Table 2: Deposit Insurance Moral Hazard and Banking System Development 
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Moreover, it is possible that countries that are more prone to crises for reasons other 
than financial liberalization and decreasing concentration introduce explicit deposit 
insurance. A history of recurrent bank runs and losses for small depositors will certainly 
increase the authorities’ willingness to consider an explicit scheme. For example, 
experiences with banking failures sometimes lead to a situation in which small 
depositors refuse to deposit money in financial intermediaries, even though stability has 
been widely achieved. In such a “cash economy”, restoring depositor confidence 
through some explicit protection becomes a primary policy objective. Likewise, 
countries with an extensive implicit safety net or a blanket guarantee might view an 
explicit and limited arrangement as the only possible way to smoothly progress to a less 
extreme regime. Indeed, Table 3 provides evidence that countries that introduce 
deposit insurance indeed are often characterized by a history of banking fragility: 
Clearly, having experienced a crisis does not have to be an informative indicator of 
future instability. At the same time, however, we cannot rule out the possibility that 
weaker financial systems select themselves out and adopt some form of explicit safety 
net. 
Systemic Crisis... Laeven (2003) Own Sample 
...shortly* before introduction of DI 36% 27% 
...shortly* after introduction of DI 10% 13% 
...only before introduction of DI - 35% 
...only after introduction of DI - 15% 
...before and after introduction of DI - 7% 
Number of schemes 72 51 
Number of countries as a share of total countries having introduced a scheme  
*Three years prior/after a crisis 
Table 3: Banking Crises and Deposit Insurance 
Finally, one can find extensive anecdotal evidence for a relation between financial 
market developments, the likelihood of experiencing a systemic crisis, and the 
propensity to introduce an explicit DIS. For example, in its response to a survey 
conducted by the International Association of Deposit Insurers, the Korea Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (KDIC) responded to the question “When and why was the DIS 
established?” in the following way: 
“The KDIC was established in June 1996. Prior to this date, there existed an implicit government 
guarantee on bank deposits. As for financial institutions in financial sectors other than the banks, each 
sector had its own method of depositor protection, usually in the form of a fund. However, financial 
liberalization and evermore-fierce global marketplace brought increased competition and ensuing 
aggressive marketing among the financial institutions. Such atmosphere envisaged heightened likelihood 
of financial institution failures. In light of such dynamic environment, the Depositor Protection Act 
(DPA) was enacted in December 1995, and the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) was 
accordingly established in June 1996 to formally protect depositors of insured financial institutions and 
to maintain public confidence in the financial system.” (CDIC, 2003) 
Indeed, the expectation that financial fragility was around the corner proved to be 
correct. The example of Korea illustrates that the introduction of explicit deposit 
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insurance might be observed in a situation where financial fragility is likely to occur, 
without being causally related to the crisis probability. 
2. Dealing with Selectivity 
Depending on the nature of selectivity and on data availability, different empirical 
methods can be used to circumvent its potentially serious consequences. If selection is 
“on unobservables” a two-step procedure might be warranted, provided there is a valid 
and economically meaningful instrument. Since we are not sure whether such a variable 
exist, we use a two-step procedure only to cross-check our results, using variables 
proposed in earlier studies. Specifically we regress the binary variable deposit insurance 
on the fraction of the population older than 65 or the number of DIS already in place 
(see Laeven, 2003, and Demigurc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). 
If selection is “on the observables” (i.e. can be explained by a vector of explanatory 
variables) other techniques are more appropriate. Approaches range from simply 
controlling for observed heterogeneity within parametric approaches, to fixed effects 
estimators, making more direct use of the panel nature of the sample. For the study on 
hand, we rely on a matching technique regularly applied in the labor economics 
literature. The use of such techniques for similar purposes was recently proposed by 
Santor (2003), Glick, Guo and Hutchison (2004) and Edwards and Magendzo (2003). 
The main idea is to find one or several non-treated unit(s) that are very similar to the 
treated country analyzed. “Similarity” refers to observable characteristics X influencing 
the probability of being treated as well as the outcome variable Y.  
For our method to be viable, some conditions have to be fulfilled. In particular, the 
matching estimator is only appropriate when the so called Conditional Mean 
Independence (CMI) assumption holds: 
)(),( 00 XYEDIXYE =  and 
)(),( 11 XYEDIXYE =         (4.) 
where X is a vector containing all variables that influence the probability of being 
treated as well as the outcome variable Y. The CMI states that selection into the 
treatment depends on the realization of observable factors. As soon as one accounts for 
these factors, the expected outcome for a country in the non-participation 
(participation) state is independent of actual participation. As a consequence, matching 
techniques are only advisable giving a rich set of variables determining both 
participation and outcome.  
If X contains many elements, the dimensionality of the problem makes it nearly 
impossible to find an exact match. Most studies therefore match treated and non-
treated units on the basis of their respective probability of being treated, p(X).22 In our 
case, we first estimate a binary model for the probability of adopting deposit insurance. 
We then match each country that actually has adopted DI with a group of comparable 
control countries that has refused to do so even though they were similar in terms of 
the vector X. The difference in propensity scores ji pp −  determines the degree of 
                                                 
22 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
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similarity between two countries i and j. Using this difference, we are able to determine 
weights [ ]1,0),( ∈jiw  for each non-treated unit that is to be compared to a treated 
unit. Let N represent the number of treated countries, and M the number of countries 
not having adopted DI. Given the weights w, we can calculate the ATT as 
∑ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ∑−
= =
N
i
j
M
j
i YjiwYN 1 011
),(1         (5.) 
The choice among different matching estimators boils down to choosing among 
different weighting schemes. For the study on hand, a Kernel-based matching 
technique is applied. Results are cross-checked using alternative methods. 
3. Other Problems 
A problem closely related to selectivity is reverse causality. The selection bias outlined 
above refers to the problem that the same factors that lead to financial fragility might 
also lead to the adoption of a deposit insurance scheme. Reverse causality, on the other 
hand, refers to a situation where a systemic crisis itself leads to the adoption of explicit 
deposit insurance. While there is no indication in the data that authorities introduce a 
scheme in the year a crisis hits (normally, a blanket guarantee is enacted in such a 
situation) it is well possible that country authorities adopt a scheme because they expect 
a crisis in the foreseeable future (see above). In such a situation, it becomes nearly 
impossible to distinguish cause and effect. 
Reverse causality manifests itself not only in terms of the treatment variable, but also in 
terms of several control variables. In particular, most existing studies use 
contemporaneous variables to control for macroeconomic factors. Obviously, a low 
growth rate of GDP or devaluation in a specific year could be both the cause and the 
consequence of a systemic crisis in that year. The problem is aggravated by the fact that 
many crises are recognized with a lag, either because country authorities refuse to 
acknowledge the severity of distress or because of a lack of appropriate data. For these 
reasons, we lag all macroeconomic controls as well as other variables (including the 
deposit insurance dummy in parametric regressions) by one year. However, to 
guarantee comparability with earlier results, we check whether this procedure changes 
the results concerning explicit deposit insurance. Note that such a procedure does not 
interfere with the basic channels used to describe the link between safety net design and 
systemic crises. All of these channels would require some extended period of time in 
which monitoring activity is low and bad loans are accumulated in banks’ balance 
sheets. 
Another potential problem in parametric studies of banking crises is sensitivity to 
functional form. In the context of studies on systemic crises, it is particularly pressing: 
Since there are only very few crises dates, the choice of a specific technique (for 
example logit versus probit estimation) may well have an impact on the results. For this 
reason, we use a semi-parametric approach as our baseline specification. We thus 
estimate the average treatment effect directly, as in equation (5.). For sake of 
comparability, we perform “robustness tests” using parametric techniques. 
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Given the reasons for the increased incidence of systemic events described in section 
II, a further complication has to be mentioned: It is well possible that deposit insurance 
itself may change the very nature of competition in the banking industry. In particular, 
as argued by Matutes and Vives (1996, 2000) and Keeley (1990), deposit insurance 
shapes the playing field that finally determines the degree of competition and 
concentration. To control for this problem, we proceed as follows: First, we estimate 
propensity scores for the whole sample. Then, we check whether the concentration 
variable can explain the introduction of a scheme if only the first deposit insurance 
observation is used in the estimation. Finally, we restrict our sample to the period 1990-
2000 to see whether yearly observations on concentration contain information on the 
likelihood of introducing a scheme. 
Furthermore, an obvious problem of empirical studies on systemic crises is the lack of 
reliable data on the dependent variable. The issues involved are extensively discussed 
elsewhere (see Eichengreen and Arteta, 2000, Ho and von Hagen, 2004, and Das, 
Quintyn and Chenard, 2004) and range from the subjectivity of defining a systemic 
crisis to the problem of accurately dating the onset of the event. Moreover, binary 
measures neglect the magnitude of an event. In spite of these problems, we use such a 
binary measure to preserve comparability with earlier studies. In addition, we believe 
that binary measures based on circumstantial evidence have certain advantages that 
sometimes may outweigh the problems. For example, they are available for an extended 
period of time, ranging back to at least the 1970s. In addition, the problem of 
magnitude cannot be easily resolved. After all, (not) experiencing a systemic crisis is a 
binary event.  
Finally, results could be sensitive to the sample of countries considered. Eichengreen 
and Arteta (2000) show that statistical significance and even the sign of certain 
coefficients (including the deposit insurance dummy) may change strongly as the 
number and type of countries is modified. While our matching technique partly 
accounts for this problem, we cross-check results using alternative samples. In 
particular, we present results for a sample of countries used in the study by D-K, for a 
larger sample including additional developing and emerging economies and a sample 
excluding OECD economies.  
IV. Data and Results 
1. Data 
1.1 Dependent Variable 
As mentioned above, the dependent variable is a binary measure of systemic crises. As 
it is standard in the literature, we only consider the onset of an event, dropping all 
subsequent crises observations from our sample. Alternatively, following Eichengreen 
and Arteta (2000), we apply three year exclusion windows around the first year of a 
crisis. Results remain largely unchanged, in particular regarding deposit insurance 
characteristics. 
To guarantee that our results are not driven by the choice of a particular definition of 
systemic events, we employ several crises lists. As a benchmark, we use the 
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classification of Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002). Here, a crisis is defined as an 
episode where either the government intervened in a well-specified way, or where the 
share of non-performing assets or the costs of rescue operations exceeded a certain 
threshold. Intervention policies sufficient to classify an episode as systemic are the 
enactment of bank holidays, deposit freezes, blanket guarantees, or large-scale 
nationalizations. The threshold for non-performing loans is 10% of total assets, the 
critical value for the cost of rescue operations 2% of GDP. Using these criteria leads to 
40 systemic banking crises in the panel of DKD (4,4% of all  observations). 
As a cross-check, we make use of the approach of Caprio and Klingenbiel (2003), 
henceforth CK. Systemic crises are identified using an anecdotal approach. A crisis is 
defined as an event where much or all of the banking system’s capital had been 
exhausted. To identify the occurrence of such an event, CK use various sources of 
information, in particular World Bank staff resources and publications on specific 
events. In total, CK present information on 117 systemic crises in 93 economies. In our 
sample, this leads to 81 crises in 72 countries (approximately 5.5% of all observations). 
While the two approaches differ, there is a significant overlap between different lists, 
since most existing classifications are based on the assessment of CK. As a final test, we 
therefore employ a list of crises that includes all events in the CK database, including 
non-systemic crises (so called borderline events). 
1.2 Deposit Insurance Design and Macroeconomic Controls 
We obtained macroeconomic information from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) and from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) for a set of 136 
countries for the period 1975-2003. After excluding transition economies and countries 
where macroeconomic information is not available for at least 10 consecutive years, 87 
countries remain. Missing data on other variables, in particular for concentration and 
other banking system characteristics, further reduce the sample to 72 countries. For the 
sake of comparability, we restrict our attention to the period 1980-1997, the time span 
used in Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002). To check whether the choice of the 
period length drives our results, we experiment with alternative start and end dates. 
While the impact on the estimated effects of explicit deposit insurance is small, the 
macroeconomic part of parametric specifications reacts quite sensitive to different 
period lengths.  
Information on the existence and design of explicit deposit insurance schemes comes 
from a database recently compiled by the author. It updates the surveys by Garcia 
(2000) and Kyei (1995), which form the basis of the World Bank dataset frequently 
used in earlier studies (see Demirgüc-Kunt and Sobaci, 2001, for a description of this 
data). A revision had become necessary because recent years saw a strong rise in the 
number of explicit schemes. Furthermore, several schemes had been changed or 
adjusted. In total, approximately 200 countries were examined. First, we identified those 
who already had an explicit DIS prior to 2000, adjusting Garcia’s list in several 
respects.23 In a second step, we added all new schemes. Furthermore, we checked for 
each country whether there were any significant changes or inconsistencies. 
                                                 
23 In particular, several countries that already had adopted a scheme prior to 2000 but were not included 
in the sample had to be added. Furthermore, some countries (in particular the six African countries of 
the Central African Currency Union: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, 
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The information on existing schemes was compiled using a variety of sources, for 
example a survey conducted by the International Association of Deposit Insurers 
(IADI) in co-operation with the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC)24. The 
latter was complemented with public information from Central Banks, Ministries of 
Finance and Deposit Insurance Agencies (DIAs), using annual reports and other 
material available at the web pages of these institutions. In most cases, it was also 
possible to cross-check available information with country laws and statutes, including 
bye-laws and regulations issued by supervisory authorities. In addition, using the 2003 
update of the World Bank database on banking regulation (see Barth, Caprio and 
Levine, 2001), we compared our results for selected characteristics, in particular 
coverage limits, fund resources as a percentage of total bank assets, and mandates of 
the DIS. For the latter piece of information, we furthermore relied on results from a 
survey on bank resolution practices and DIS risk assessment policies conducted by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 2000 and 2001 (see Coburn and 
O’Keefe, 2003, and Bennett, 2001). Finally, ambiguous or contradictory details were 
discussed with country experts at the IMF and with local authorities. 
1.3 Financial System Characteristics 
Data on domestic financial liberalization is compiled using various sources. We start 
with information from Williamson and Mahar (1998) on the date of interest rate 
deregulation. We augment the resulting dataset with information from Demigurc-Kunt 
and Detragiache (1998), Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), and various IMF and EIU 
country reports. Information on the institutional environment (measures of 
bureaucratic quality, the rule of law, democratic accountability and corruption) are from 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) published by the PRS Group. We also 
use several measures capturing the stage of economic and financial development. In 
addition to GDP per capita, we use dummy variables for high-income or OECD 
countries (excluding transition countries, Mexico and Turkey), and for countries 
considered to be “emerging markets”. The emerging market dummy is obtained using 
information from Standard & Poor’s Emerging Markets Fact Book. It takes a value of 1 
for all years in which a country was included in this report. We use this measure 
because it is highly correlated with variables measuring the degree of actual financial 
integration and development (see Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose, 2003). Since we 
conjecture that countries are more likely to introduce an explicit scheme after they have 
entered a certain stage of financial development, the expected sign of the variable is 
positive. 
Data on the concentration of the banking sector is computed along the lines of Beck, 
Demigurc-Kunt and Levine (2003). Specifically, we use data from Bankscope as well as 
the information in the 2003 update of the World Bank database on financial structure 
(see Beck, Demigurc-Kunt and Levine, 1999) to obtain the share of assets held by the 
three largest banks. Extracting that kind of information from Bankscope entails several 
problems. In particular, the first observations for a country normally do not include a 
large number of banks. Consequently, the first measures of concentration tend to be 
                                                                                                                                         
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon) who had formally introduced a scheme that never became operational 
were removed. 
24 The completed questionnaires as well as a brief summary of findings are available at 
http://www.iadi.org/. 
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upward biased. In addition, data is only available for a period starting 1989. To 
minimize potential distortions, we follow other studies and average the concentration 
variable over the sample period. To check for robustness, we proceed as follows: First, 
we use a three year moving average as our measure of concentration. Second we take 
the actual values from Bankscope, holding the first observed value constant for periods 
without data. Third, we use the information contained in the World Bank Database on 
Financial Regulation. 
Finally, we obtained data on country characteristics that could be important pre-
conditions for a successful implementation of explicit deposit insurance. Given the list 
of factors derived in section II, we are particularly interested in information on the 
supervisory framework, the structure of the financial safety net apart from depositor 
protection and ownership variables. Information on foreign ownership of banks and 
supervisory powers are taken from the World Bank’s Database on Banking Regulation. 
Data on government ownership of banks was taken from La Porta, Lopez and Shleifer 
(2002), data on central bank independence from De Haan and Sturm (2003). The last 
two sources have the advantage of providing information for two different time spans 
(prior to and after 1990). 
2. Results: The explicitness of deposit insurance  
2.1 Results from Propensity Score Matching  
2.1.1 Estimation of Propensity Scores and Bias Reduction 
In a first step, we estimate a participation equation by maximum likelihood, using a 
probit specification. At this stage, the sample is restricted to a one used in Demigurc-
Kunt and Detragiache (2002), to preserve comparability with earlier studies.25 As 
explanatory variables, one should include a large variety of measures that may influence 
the decision to introduce a scheme as well as the likelihood of experiencing a crisis. 
Moreover, many studies in the evaluation literature use a large number of interaction 
terms and squared variables. Since our sample is significantly smaller than usual samples 
in the labor market area, we abstain from this practice. only including three types of 
covariates: Lagged macroeconomic controls (real GDP growth, CPI Inflation, and the 
ratio of private credit to GDP), variables that characterize the structure of the financial 
system (the degree of market concentration, a dummy for domestic financial 
liberalization, and our measure for actual financial integration), and variables that 
characterize the stage of development in a more general way (in particular, GDP per 
capita). While the expected sign for the first group is a priori unclear, we anticipate 
positive signs for financial liberalization, financial integration and GDP per capita, and 
a negative sign for concentration.   
As can be seen from Table 4 (Model I) in the appendix, results are consistent with our 
reasoning in section III: Financially liberalized countries with less concentrated banking 
systems are more likely to make their system of depositor protection explicit. In fact, 
the concentration variable is highly significant regardless of the specification (see 
below). Moreover, having experienced a crisis in the past (i.e. before deposit insurance 
was introduced) also increases the likelihood that a specific country enacts a DI 
                                                 
25Except for one country, that was dropped because of missing data (People’s Republic of Kongo). 
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legislation.26 Note that all specifications include several variables capturing the stage of 
development of a country: Consistent with the fact that high-income countries usually 
have a deposit insurance scheme, GDP per capita and the OECD dummy are positive 
and significant. More interestingly, the “emerging market dummy” also enters positively 
and is significant in all specifications. A possible interpretation for this finding is that 
countries that are more financially integrated have an additional incentive to shield their 
depositors from the consequences of abrupt reversals in capital flows. 
How well does the data describe the decision to operate a financial system under 
explicit depositor protection? In all models (including the one reported below), the 
Pseudo R2 as a measure of “Goodness-of-fit” reaches levels (between 0.35 and 0.5) that 
can be considered high compared to other, similar studies. As another test of predictive 
power, Table 5 reports the share of observations that are correctly predicted. Overall, 
85% of all observations (82% of the explicit deposit insurance observations and 87% of 
the implicit schemes) are correctly predicted.  
Before we discuss the results in terms of treatment effects, it is useful to examine 
whether matching indeed reduces covariate imbalances. Table 6 in the appendix 
therefore reports the “bias” observed before and after matching, using a subset of 
explanatory variables. Specifically, we calculate the difference in sample means in the 
treated and non-treated sub-samples before and after matching. We standardize the 
measures using the square root of the average of the sample variances in the respective 
groups, following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). As can be seen from the table, 
unmatched observations indeed show a strong and significant divergence between 
treated and non-treated units. At the same time, matching consistently reduces the 
standardized difference by large amounts, ranging from 74% to 98% of the original 
discrepancy. Moreover, kernel density estimates for treated and non-treated 
observations (Figure 1-3) show that matching visibly reduces differences in estimated 
distribution functions. For example, treatment and control groups become much more 
similar in terms of macroeconomic controls (figure 2 and 3) as well as financial system 
characteristics (figure 1).  
2.1.2 Average Treatment Effects 
In a next step, the probit estimates are used to predict the conditional probability of 
being treated, i.e. of choosing to introduce explicit deposit insurance.27 Given these 
predictions, observations are matched using the Kernel approach.28 Specifically, we 
match each treated unit in a given year with several non-treated countries, applying 
weights negatively related to the difference in propensity scores. This procedure 
guarantees that we do not compare a country in a specific period with itself in another 
period. In a specific year, a country of the treatment group (for example Chile since 
1986) is matched to several countries of the control group (countries that did not have 
an explicit scheme in the same year). Countries that share similar characteristics 
concerning macroeconomic developments, financial liberalization, banking structure 
and stage of development (for example Korea in the first half of the 1990ies, after it 
had liberalized its financial system, but before it introduced an explicit scheme in 1996) 
receive high weights in the subsequent analysis. 
                                                 
26 However, results do not depend on this feature, as explained below. 
27 To check for robustness, we performed linear and non-linear predictions of the fitted model. However, 
results remain largely unchanged. 
28 Matching is performed using the stata module psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003). 
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Table 7 presents the Average Treatment Effects on the Treated for the restricted 
sample (propensity scores from Model I). The ATT after matching is negative, implying 
that introducing an explicit scheme reduces the likelihood of experiencing a systemic 
crisis. The effect is surprisingly strong: The crisis probability is reduced by 5 percentage 
points and is significant at the 10% level (note that standard errors were corrected to 
account for the additional variance that is due to the prior estimation of propensity 
scores). However, as will become clear below, the magnitude of the effect of explicit 
deposit insurance is not very stable. Moreover, only a subset of estimates is significant. 
However, the sign of the ATT is consistently negative. We therefore do not conclude 
that explicit deposit insurance reduces the probability of distress by a specific amount. 
Nor do we argue that countries should introduce a scheme. Rather, we present 
evidence that countries that did choose to be treated in recent decades may have done 
so for well-specified reasons. 
Finally, it is important to note that the result above (a relatively large and significant 
reduction in the crisis probability) does not imply negative probabilities. To understand 
why and to see what drives our results, it is useful to ask how the estimates in Table 7 
compare to those using unmatched data. As can be seen from Table 8, the major 
difference between matched and unmatched data is a very high crisis probability for the 
matched control group. The difference between those countries that received the 
treatment and the original control group is zero - explicit insurance seems to have no 
effect on systemic risk. In contrast, the crisis probability for the matched control group 
is very high (approximately 10%): Countries similar to the ones that introduced a 
scheme, but did not do so, thus run a high risk of experiencing a systemic crisis.29 This 
is another way of stating our main argument: Explicit deposit insurance may be the 
response to specific structural changes that imply more financial fragility; accounting 
for this possibility may significantly alter policy assessments. 
2.2 Robustness Tests and Parametric Estimates 
2.2.1 Alternative Matching Techniques 
To check whether our results are driven by the choice of a specific matching technique, 
we repeat the procedure above using nearest neighbor matching. Table 9 in the 
appendix presents results for the ATT using one as well as five nearest neighbors (to 
facilitate the comparison, Kernel estimates are also included). While the sign and the 
magnitude of the ATT are relatively stable (ranging from -5.6 percentage points with 
only one matched observation to -6.1 with 5 nearest neighbors), not all estimates are 
significant. In particular, matching with only one control observation yields a p-value of 
only 0.115. It is worth noting that, given our small sample, nearest neighbor matching 
with only 1 match per treated observation is very unlikely to produce significant results. 
In contrast, matching with five control observations confirms the result from section 
2.1.2. Moreover, nearest neighbor matching once more illustrates the effects at work 
(Table 10): Since all treated units now have a common support, the sole factor driving 
our results is a strong increase in the susceptibility of control countries to a systemic 
event. 
                                                 
29 Note that the effect does not depend on the exclusion of a relatively small number of observations that 
received the treatment, but were excluded from the sample because of a lack of common support (see 
section IV.2.2.1 for details). 
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In Table 11, we examine whether and how the restriction that only different countries 
can be matched together affects our results. Lifting the restriction (i.e. allowing the 
matching of a country with itself in another period, provided it introduced a scheme in 
the meantime) does not influence the results when Kernel matching is applied: A 
significant negative effect of comparable magnitude (-5.2 percentage points) can be 
observed. 
2.2.2 Robustness of Selection Equation 
Since the reliability of our semi-parametric estimation technique strongly depends on 
the quality of propensity scores (i.e. extend to which observable factors explain the 
treatment status), we present several rather extreme robustness tests of the participation 
equation. Table 12 in the appendix reports results for two different models, labeled 
Model II and III. While Model I above is restricted to the sample used in Demigurc-
Kunt and Detragiache (2002), Model II uses our own, enlarged sample and the crisis list 
compiled from information in Caprio and Klingenbiel (2003). Model III, again using 
the larger sample, excludes all observations following the year in which an explicit 
scheme was enacted. The objective of this exclusion is to account for the possibility 
that explicit deposit insurance itself determines relevant country characteristics. 
Using our enlarged sample and the crisis dummy compiled from Caprio and 
Klingenbiel (2003) raises several interesting points. In general, the results obtained 
above are confirmed: First, matching again significantly reduces covariate imbalances 
(Table 13). Second, financially liberalized and integrated countries that have a less 
concentrated banking system are more likely to have explicit deposit insurance. While 
the values of coefficients do change to some extent, their signs remain unchanged. 
Moreover, all relevant variables remain significant. Somewhat surprisingly, some of the 
lagged macroeconomic variables now significantly influence the treatment decision. 
Model III is used as an extreme check of our results. In particular, explicit deposit 
insurance itself may be responsible for structural change in the financial system and the 
overall economy. We therefore exclude all observations following the year in which an 
explicit scheme was enacted and use the actually observed concentration variable in a 
specific year as explanatory variable. Since the second specification has only very few 
observations for which the deposit insurance dummy takes a value of 1 (1 observation 
per country that actually has a scheme), it is clear that its predictive power is reduced 
significantly. However, the signs of all coefficients are unchanged. Most importantly, 
the variables describing the fragility and concentration of the banking sector remain 
significant. In light of this evidence, we believe that the observed relationships are not 
the result of reverse causality. In particular, since all variables enter with a lag and 
Model II excludes observations after the introduction of DI, it is unlikely that deposit 
insurance itself (via its potential effect on market structure and systemic risk) drives the 
results. 
As a further test, we estimated a version of the selection equation that accounts for 
potential heteroscedasticity (Model IV/Table 14). In particular, we allow the variance of 
the cumulative distribution function to vary as a function of independent variables, in 
particular GDP per capita. This procedure allows us to test for heteroscedasticity and to 
check whether our results are affected by its presence. While there is some indication 
for the presence of heteroscedasticity, results for propensity scores and the ATT remain 
largely unchanged (see below).  
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Finally, we performed a variety of other robustness tests that are only reported in 
extracts (Table 15). Specifically, we test whether our results are driven by a particular 
definition of the concentration variable (by using a three-year moving average and the 
concentration variable from the World Bank Database on Banking Regulation – Model 
V), the inclusion of a specific set of covariates (like past crisis, regional dummies, or 
financial integration – Model VI) or the presence of hyperinflationary outliers. Neither 
the use of alternative definitions of concentration, nor the exclusion of variables as 
“past crisis” or regional dummies impact the selection equation decisively. In 
conclusion, very different specifications of the participation equation yield qualitatively 
similar results. Moreover, matching significantly reduces covariate imbalances in all 
cases.  
2.2.3 Average Treatment Effects after Alternative Selection Equations 
Based on the above results in section 2.1 and 2.2.1, we could conclude that introducing 
explicit deposit insurance significantly reduces the risk of experiencing a systemic crisis. 
How robust are these results to different sample sizes, crisis definitions, and 
specifications of the propensity score estimations? Table 16 and Table 17 present 
Treatment Effects for Model II and III. In both specifications using the enlarged 
sample, matching reduces the insignificantly positive effect explicit deposit insurance 
has on the probability of experiencing a crisis substantially – the ATT becomes 
negative. We view this result as an illustration of the general mechanism at work – as 
soon as one controls for covariate imbalances, the tendency to confuse cause and effect 
of explicit deposit insurance are attenuated. However, corrected standard errors 
increase somewhat when the larger sample is used.  
In all other robustness test, results are very similar: Independent of the definition of the 
concentration variable (Table 19), we get negative estimates of the ATT that are of 
comparable magnitude (around 5%). When certain variables are excluded (Table 20), 
the ATT is no longer significant in all cases, but still negative. An exception is the ATT 
based on propensity scores from the model that accounts for potential 
heteroscedasticity. Here the (negative) ATT is strongly significant and increases 
substantially, to a value of around 8% (Table 18). Together with the results in section 
2.1 and 2.2.1, these estimates hint to the following conclusion: The negative sign of the 
ATT seems to be a stable characteristic in all estimations. The relatively low variability 
in the value of the ATT reinforces this result. While the negative coefficient is 
significant in most of our preferred specifications, statistical interference does not 
always yield a clear outcome. However, in most cases using the Kernel approach (which 
can be considered the appropriate method given our relatively small sample), the Null 
Hypotheses of no difference between the treated and the untreated is rejected. 
Moreover, the 95% confidence interval of most estimates ranges from a negative value 
to a value very close or equal to zero. Consequently, we are confident that our results 
do indeed show that explicit deposit insurance does not increase financial system 
vulnerability.  
2.2.4 Parametric Estimates 
As a final test of our results, we run logistic regressions in the spirit of earlier studies, 
controlling for the level of concentration and for financial liberalization in a binary 
regression (Table 21). Our objective is to check whether our results carry through using 
a more standard parametric technique that controls for characteristics that jointly 
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determine the likelihood of being treated and of having a systemic crisis. We again use 
both samples and crisis lists, but only report results for the restricted sample.  
The upper part of Table 21 replicates the estimation in DKD, using our own dataset on 
deposit insurance. As in DKD, the deposit insurance dummy is positive and significant. 
However, as soon as we control for the level of concentration and/or financial 
liberalization (the second and third part of Table 21), it looses significance. More 
strikingly, the coefficient of deposit insurance changes its sign and becomes negative as 
soon as we jointly control for the level of financial liberalization, concentration and 
financial integration. At the same time, the three other variables remain significant at 
the 5% and 10% significance level. We interpret these results as confirmation of our 
earlier results: Accounting for country characteristics that may jointly determine the 
adoption of a scheme and the likelihood of experiencing a systemic crisis may 
substantially alter the results of policy impact studies. 
3. Design Features of Explicit Schemes 
The preceding analysis suggests that existing studies on the effects of explicit deposit 
insurance may suffer from a selection bias: Countries that enter a specific stage of 
(financial) development are more likely to introduce an explicit scheme. If this new 
stage implies a higher vulnerability to crises, the relation between the explicitness of an 
arrangement and financial fragility is likely to become spurious. Does this result also 
bias results for specific design features? We believe that this is likely for two reasons. 
First, the selection bias for explicitness is likely to carry through to design features: 
Specific characteristics are only observed in explicit regimes, and certain design features 
like pre-funding are the predominant way to implement a scheme. Second, DI 
characteristics themselves might be the consequence of a set of preconditions related to 
financial fragility. For example, observing an unusually high coverage ratio or the 
protection of inter-bank deposits might simply be a political reaction to a lack of 
depositor confidence and a pronounced vulnerability to bank runs. In fact, some of the 
insurance schemes introduced recently seem to serve as substitutes for blanket 
guarantees, and not as a policy tool to foreclose runs on individual banks. 
Instead of going through a detailed analysis of these important issues, we exemplify the 
consequences, again using semi-parametric and parametric techniques. In particular, we 
estimate the effect of the treatment “Pre-funding depositor protection” (Table 22). 
Moreover, we calculate a “moral hazard index” in the spirit of earlier studies, using 
principal component analysis. Subsequently, we check whether its predictive power is 
impacted by outliers in terms of the coverage ratio (coverage ratios above 5 times 
GDP). The first type of test is intended to check whether the “explicitness bias” 
outlined above carries through to individual design features. The second type of 
analysis checks whether there is an additional effect on design features independent of 
the “explicitness bias”. Table 22 and Table 23 largely confirm our reasoning. Not 
surprisingly, the measured effect of pre-funding is very similar to the one of making 
protection explicit. Since the large majority of formalized regimes require banks to pay 
a premium ex ante, Average Treatment Effects on the Treated should not display a 
large variation. The moral hazard index (which includes such design features as the 
exclusion of inter-bank and foreign currency deposits, coverage relative to GDP per 
capita, and funding arrangements) does significantly increase systemic risk for the 
whole range of coverage ratios (Table 23, upper part). As soon as we exclude 
 36
observations for which the ratios exceed a value of 5, the effect becomes insignificant 
(Table 23, upper part). It is important to note that the estimates in Table 23 do not 
include the whole range of covariates responsible for the first type of bias. The effect 
thus seems to be due to the exclusion of countries that operate their scheme under 
unusually high coverage.  
V. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is not to promote a specific form for financial safety net 
design, namely an arrangement including explicit deposit insurance. Rather, we have the 
more modest objective to take a second look at theory and evidence. Our analysis 
emphasizes three interrelated aspects. First, the adoption of a certain structure for the 
financial safety net should be understood as an endogenous response to certain 
developments in the financial system. Indeed, the evidence presented above clearly 
suggests that specific circumstances increase the likelihood of a specific arrangement: 
The degree to which a system of depositor protection exhibits “explicitness” will 
depend on certain characteristics of the banking industry. Specifically, as financial 
markets develop and become less concentrated, the political authorities’ propensity to 
introduce a scheme will increase. 
Second, the fact that safety net features are endogenous might lead to a problem of 
selectivity. Econometric evaluations of safety net policies should account for this 
possibility: Country characteristics related to the probability of experiencing a systemic 
crisis could also increase the likelihood of adopting an explicit scheme. Not accounting 
for such selectivity leads to biased results and wrong policy advices. As the analysis 
above shows, the average effect of the treatment “explicit deposit insurance” on the 
probability of experiencing a systemic crisis indeed seems to be highly sensitive to this 
problem. To a more limited extend, the same holds true for specific design 
characteristics, like coverage limits, funding arrangements, or the exclusion of certain 
deposit types. Here, the results may be additionally influenced by the fact that some 
countries exhibit a certain structure (for example, a high coverage level) because they 
are in a situation in which the likelihood of runs is very large and the desire to stabilize 
expectations particularly pronounced. 
Finally, the evidence presented here suggests that it is questionable whether recent 
contributions blaming explicit deposit insurance for increased fragility survive closer 
inspection. Indeed, our results indicate that the relation between the degree of 
explicitness of depositor protection and financial fragility is modest, and, if anything, 
negative. The potentially stabilizing effect of explicit schemes, however, should not be 
overemphasized. Rather, our results should be interpreted in the sense that explicit 
deposit insurance cannot be blamed for increased vulnerability to crises in recent 
decades.  
What are the implications of our analysis for policymakers contemplating the 
introduction of an explicit scheme? First, our analysis does not show that developing 
countries should introduce explicit deposit insurance as soon as possible. Rather, we 
present evidence that the countries that had introduced a scheme in the 1970ies, 80ies 
and 90ies did so without destabilizing their banking system. Second, this does not imply 
that explicit protection cannot be the root of major problems in the banking sector. In 
fact, we believe that the each country has to carefully check whether the different 
 37
preconditions necessary to support such a step are fulfilled. In this respect, further 
research on the nature of these preconditions is of paramount importance. 
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VII. Appendix 
 
Table 4: Probit Estimates of Propensity Scores (Model I) 
 
Table 5: Predictive Power of Model I 
 
Table 6: Reduction in Covariate Imbalances
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Figure 1: Kernel Density Estimates for Concentration 
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Figure 2: Kernel Density Estimates for Credit to GDP 
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Figure 3: Kernel Density Estimates for Inflation 
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Table 7: Average Treatment Effect on Treated (Restricted Sample, Kernel Matching) 
 
Table 8: Estimation Details for Table 7 
 
Table 9: Robustness: Alternative Matching Techniques 
 
Table 10: Estimation Details for Table 9 
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Table 11: Robustness: Allowing for Matching between Different Periods 
 
Table 12: Propensity Score Estimation using the Enlarged Sample 
 
Table 13: Reduction in Covariate Imbalances for Model II 
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Table 14: Heteroscedastic Probit Model (Model IV) 
 
Table 15: Robustness: Alternative Specifications for Selection Equation 
 
Table 16: ATT for Enlarged Sample (Model II) 
 
Table 17: ATT for Enlarged Sample – Only First DI Observation (Model III) 
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Table 18: ATT after accounting for Heteroscedasticity (Model IV) 
 
Table 19: ATT with Alternative Concentration Variable (Model V) 
 
Table 20: ATT with Reduced Model (Model VI) 
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Table 21: Parametric Estimates 
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Table 22: Treatment Effect of Pre-funding Deposit Insurance 
 
 
Table 23: Banking Crisis and the Moral Hazard Index 
 
 
